I. INTRODUCTION
A prominent finding in various national surveys is that a significant fraction of the elderly in the United States, generally at least 20%, have little or no liquid wealth. 2 Despite all the differences in the design and the year of study of the surveys, the finding of a substantial number of low-wealth elderly is very robust. The stylized fact has puzzled many economists. Why do so many people save so little? Unless lifetime earnings 1 I thank John Boyd III, Gregory Chow, Thomas Cooley, George Chressanthis, James Davies, Issac Ehrlich, Eric Engen, Bruce Jacobs, James Kahn, Laurence Kotlikoff, Thad Mirer, Nancy Stokey, Danyang Xie, and a referee for helpful comments and suggestions.
2 Ž . For evidence based on earlier surveys, see Diamond 1977 and Diamond and Hausman Ž . Ž . Ž . 1984 . For more recent surveys, see Eller 1994 , Poterba et al. 1994 , Gustman and Juster Ž . Ž . 1995 , Mitchell and Moore 1997 , and the references therein.
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1094-2025r00 $ 35.00 are particularly low or discount rates are unusually high, widespread low wealth accumulation does not seem to be consistent with optimal or rational behavior. The difficulties in resolving the puzzle within the conventional economic framework have affected economic research both empirically and theoretically. On the empirical side, some economists choose to eliminate all the low-wealth individuals from the sample in their data analyses because they believe that the standard life-cycle theory of saving is not applicable to Ž those individuals e.g., King and Dicks-Mireaux, 1982; Diamond and Haus-. man, 1984; Bernheim, 1991 . On the theoretical front, a number of economists contend that the rational, forward-looking, and optimizing approach is not suitable for studying saving behavior at all because the decision problem is too complicated and the assumptions are simply Ž . unrealistic e.g., Bernheim and Scholz, 1993; Thaler, 1994 . They abandon the conventional economic rational approach and develop either quasi-rational or nonrational models to solve the puzzle.
There are very few systematic attempts to reconcile widespread low wealth holdings with a rational model of saving. In a recent contribution, Ž . Hubbard et al. 1995 propose that a standard life-cycle model of precautionary saving with asset-based, means-tested social insurance can account for low wealth holdings among the aged as well as the nonaged. Welfare programs discourage saving especially for low-lifetime-income households because the transfer payments provide a safety net in times of adversity and the eligibility tests impose an implicit 100% tax on both earnings and assets.
In this paper, I offer a rational theory of low wealth accumulation that does not rely on social insurance. While asset-based, means-tested welfare programs may play a significant role in reducing saving, there are at least two reasons to suspect that other important forces are also at work. First, the definition of wealth in the model of Hubbard et al. is debatable. Many Ž . welfare programs like Aid to Families with Dependent Children AFDC , Ž . Supplemental Security Income SSI , and food stamps do not include home Ž . equity as well as certain types of assets in the asset tests, whereas there is Ž no distinction between housing wealth and nonhousing wealth or any type . of wealth in their model. Hence, all of the wealth is counted in the asset test in their model, but in reality only part of the wealth is included. Thus, the asset-tested welfare programs actually overtax the wealth in their model, producing a larger percentage of families with wealth less than income. This upward bias suggests that their model may actually account for only part of the low-wealth families. Second, the social insurance argument solves only part of the puzzle because it is mainly applicable to low-lifetime-income households. As Hubbard et al. themselves acknowl- edge, welfare programs have a much weaker impact on higher-lifetime-income households than lower-lifetime-income households because welfare benefits and the uninsured risks of medical expenses are a much smaller fraction of the lifetime resources of the former group. Hence, low wealth holdings among a substantial fraction of higher-lifetime-income households remains a puzzle. 3 Because of these considerations, it is worthwhile to search for additional determinants of widespread low wealth holdings.
Adhering to the conventional economic rational framework, this paper aims to show that, without social insurance, uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint can also contribute to low wealth holdings. In the absence of bequest motives and life annuities, I demonstrate that it is optimal and rational for some individuals to save little and entirely decumulate their assets well before the maximum lifetime. When there is uncertainty about the length of life and borrowing against future earnings is not permitted, the force of mortality increases impatience to such an extent that some individuals will choose to consume most of their income and save little because the assets are useless if they die sooner than expected.
It has long been recognized that lifetime uncertainty can reduce saving Ž . e.g., Rae, 1834; Fisher, 1930 . A novel contribution of this paper is to explain why and how uncertain lifetime reduces saving via terminal wealth depletion. By proving analytically that wealth must be exhausted at some instant before the maximum lifetime and that there is entirely no asset accumulation after that instant, I can then utilize the terminal wealth depletion time to explain why some individuals, especially the elderly, hold little or no wealth. The earlier the wealth is terminally exhausted, the longer will be the duration of low and zero wealth. The depletion is terminal, not temporary. I provide some simulation results to demonstrate that terminal wealth depletion can occur very early. In some cases it happens in just a few years after retirement. My model can therefore account for widespread low wealth holdings especially among the elderly.
In addition to solving the puzzle, my theory also provides an answer for the heretofore unexplained finding of terminal wealth depletion in the 3 For evidence that a significant fraction of higher-lifetime-income households also hold Ž . Ž . very little wealth, see Diamond 1977 and Diamond and Hausman 1984 . They demonstrate that the low-wealth phenomenon is not confined to the bottom of the income distribution. In Ž . a different but related study, Masson 1988 shows that income or permanent income explains only a minor part of the wealth distribution. The fact that variations in wealth at retirement are much larger than variations in lifetime income suggest that low wealth accumulation is not just a reflection of low lifetime income; other factors have also contributed to the Ž . outcome. In fact, the data in Hubbard et al. 1995, Uncertainty about the length of life exerts two opposite effects on saving. It raises precautionary saving because life may be longer than expected, but it may also discourage saving because unused assets are Ž . wasted especially for those who have no bequest motives if life is shorter than expected. Because of these two offsetting forces, the net impact of uncertain lifetime on saving, in the context of a standard life-cycle model, is theoretically ambiguous. Despite the ambiguity, there is a common perception among many economists, based primarily on the widely cited Ž . Ž work of Davies 1981 , that uncertain lifetime reduces dissaving or in-. creases saving . In an attempt to account for the observed slow dissaving among the elderly, Davies proposes a theory to show that, with the most plausible parameters, uncertain lifetime will likely have a negative impact Ž . on consumption relative to what it would be if lifetime was certain . He offers illustrative computations to show that the negative impact indeed prevails and the magnitude is large enough to explain much of the lack of decumulation by the elderly. Thus, Davies' results suggest that uncertain lifetime reduces decumulation, which is opposite to the thesis of this paper that uncertain lifetime raises decumulation. To resolve this inconsistency, I conduct a simulation study similar to Davies', adding an explicit terminal wealth depletion time into the setup that is absent in Davies' computational procedure. In contrast to Davies' results, I find that in almost all cases, consumption under uncertain lifetime is higher than consumption under certain lifetime, which means that uncertain lifetime hastens dissaving. Thus, my simulation results do not support the claim that uncertain lifetime is responsible for the low rate of dissaving among the retired. To the contrary, uncertain lifetime accounts for low wealth holdings and rapid asset decumulation. These findings signify the importance of incorporating an explicit terminal wealth depletion time into simulation work, call into question the common perception that uncertain lifetime reduces dissaving, Ž . and suggest that one has to look for other factors to explain the tentative observed slow dissaving among the aged.
Finally, I discuss why only a significant fraction, but not all, of the elderly hold little or no wealth. The analysis produces a list of probable characteristics of those elderly people who have little or no wealth. They are most likely to be individuals who have no bequest motives, no actuarially fair life annuities, low initial wealth, low risk aversion, high discount rates, low interest rates, high income, or poor health.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model and investigates what types of individuals would be more likely to deplete their wealth early. 4 Section III demonstrates the importance of incorporating terminal wealth depletion into the design of numerical analysis. Section IV offers some simulation results to substantiate the theory and reviews other supportive empirical evidence in the literature. Section V compares the findings with Davies' results. Section VI explores why only a significant fraction of the elderly hold little or no wealth. Section VII concludes the paper. The borrowing constraint is not as restrictive as it first appears to be. Debts in the form of Ž . collateralized loans such as home mortgages are permitted, as long as they are not allowed to exceed the total current value of traded assets. The purpose of the constraint is to prohibit the individual from borrowing against his future income.
Then c t and S t satisfy the necessary optimality conditions 9 ᎐ 12 ,
Ž .
An important property of this model is the existence of terminal wealth depletion.
Since m T ) 0, 3 , 4 , and 6 imply that c T ) 0, hence
. never reach zero as S t is increasing at an increasing rate , contradict-
Ž . Ž x ing 6 . Now suppose the proposition is not true; then S Ј t F 0 on , T ࠻ Ž . and S T s 0 imply that there must exist an such that F -T and Mirer 1992 Mirer , 1994 because the condition m T ) 0 is satisfied in these studies.
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Ž . While this model is a special case of the one studied in Leung 1994 , the proof of Proposition 1 is new. The proof is considerably simpler than Ž . that in Leung 1994 mainly because of the assumption that j is a constant, ࠻ Ž . ࠻ Ž . which allows the sign of S Ј t to be deduced from S Љ t . A simple and intuitive interpretation which highlights the rationale behind the proof can Ž . Ž . Ž . be given as follows. Suppose 2 and 3 are never binding; then 9 and Ž .
Ž . y␣ t Ž ࠻ Ž .. Ž . 10 give the usual optimality condition ⍀ t e gЈ c t s t s Ž . yj t 0 e ; i.e., the expected discounted marginal utility of consumption,
Ž . ⍀ t e gЈ c t , is equal to the marginal value of wealth t . If m T
. that ⍀ t e gЈ c t will eventually decline to zero as t approaches T,
Ž . while t will fall to its minimum 0 e ) 0. Hence, there exists a time
In other words, the Ž . y␣ t Ž ࠻ Ž .. Ž . yj t equality ⍀ t e gЈ c t s 0 e cannot hold for all t, which means Ž .
Ž . w x w . that 2 or 3 , or both, must bind on t*, T for some t* g 0, T . Since Ž . Ž . m T ) 0, 2 cannot bind in the neighborhood of T because this will Ž . Ž . violate 6 . Thus, 3 must bind in the neighborhood of T, in which case
.
The above interpretation shows that the key factor that causes wealth depletion is uncertain lifetime because it eventually drives the effective Ž Ž . Ž . Ž . . discount rate for the future to infinity ⍀ t in 9 and ⍀ T s 0 . As 
Ž
. Ž . emphasized in Rae 1834 and Fisher 1930 , uncertain lifetime increases impatience and tends to reduce saving. What is new here is the analytical and unambiguous result that the uncertainty of lifetime will eventually lead to terminal wealth depletion before the maximum lifetime.
Although uncertain lifetime drives terminal wealth depletion, there are many factors that determine when it will take place. As explained in Leung Ž . 1997 , one can investigate the determinants of t* by the following proce-Ž . Ž . w x Ž . Ž . dure. Assume that t s t s 0 for t g 0, t* ; then 9 and 10 imply
Hence, t* is determined implicitly by 16 . Although 16 does not offer an explicit solution for t*, it can be employed to derive the following sensitivity results.
, where is a shift parameter for the Ž . mortality hazard x ; then Ѩ t*rѨ -0.
Ž . a shift parameter is introduced into m t , i.e., m t s m t . Then
0 Ѩ t*rѨ F 0. Ž . t* yj z w Ž ࠻ Ž .. Ž ࠻ Ž ..x Ž . Proof. Let ⌿ t* s H e gЈ c z rg Љ c z dz. i See Leung 0 Ž . Ž . 1997 for the proofs of Ѩ t*rѨ S 0 ) 0 and Ѩ t*rѨ␣ -0. To prove Ž . Ž . Ž .w x Ѩ t*rѨ j ) 0, differentiate 16 with respect to j, ⌬ t* ⌿ t* Ѩ t*rѨ j s t* yjt w ࠻ Ž . Ž .x t* yjt Ž .w Ž ࠻ Ž .. Ž ࠻ Ž ..
x H e t c t y m t dt y H e t* y t gЈ c t rg Љ c t dt. Using 0 0
t* yjt w ࠻ Ž . 
Ž .x integration by parts, one can verify that H e t c t y m t dt s
The comparative statics results are intuitively reasonable. Increases in the initial wealth delay the terminal wealth depletion time. The more impatient the individual, the sooner the wealth will be exhausted. When the interest rate is low, the returns to assets are small, so the wealth is exhausted earlier. An individual with a higher mortality hazard will run down his assets earlier because he may not live long enough to enjoy his wealth. More risk averse individuals hold on to their wealth for a longer period of time. Other things being equal, people with higher income deplete their wealth earlier. Hence, in contrast to the social insurance Ž . argument of Hubbard et al. 1995 , my model can explain why even some higher-lifetime-income households may hold little wealth.
III. THEORY AND NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
Apart from theoretical significance, the findings in Section II also have important implications for numerical analysis. The literature on life-cycle saving is filled with studies employing numerical analysis to examine either Ž . Ž . Ž the time paths of c t and S t as tractable characterizations of the . trajectories are in general difficult to obtain or the quantitative properties Ž . of the model as in calibration exercises . By specifying functional forms and assigning parameter values for the model, these studies compute numerically the optimal solutions and other functions or parameters of interest.
A referee of this article raised an important issue concerning the relevance of the preceding theoretical results on the proper design of the numerical analysis: Should special steps be taken to explicitly incorporate terminal wealth depletion into the design of the numerical analysis? The referee asserts that it is not necessary to take special steps to incorporate terminal wealth depletion into the design of the numerical analysis because if such depletion is optimal, it will emerge naturally as a result of an Ž . appropriate analysis. According to the referee, the solution c t that Ž . Ž . Ž . satisfies 3 and obeys 14 from t s 0 to t s t*, where S t* s 0 occurs,
Ž . Ž . Eq. 14 , and iii the time path of m t is all one needs to compute the optimal consumption path in the numerical analysis. While this is a natural and reasonable claim, it misses a subtle feature of the model. In this section, I provide an example to disprove the referee's claim and offer an explanation for the necessity of incorporating terminal wealth depletion into the design of the numerical analysis.
To enhance exposition, I employ a simple example that can be solved analytically. Although the analytical solvability of the example may render the purported numerical analysis somewhat redundant, it actually has the distinct advantage that all the arguments involved can be precisely proved or disproved. Consider an individual with a logarithmic utility and a Ž Ž .. Ž Ž .. uniformly distributed lifetime. More specifically, let g c t s log c t , 
Substituting 20 into the wealth path S t s S q H m t dt y H c t dt
Ž . Hence, the algorithm will generate 20 and 21 as the optimal solution. An easy and efficient way to resolve the conundrum is to incorporate t* directly into the numerical analysis. The incidence of terminal wealth depletion in effect shortens the horizon of the optimal control problem from T to t*. As the endpoint of the control problem changes from a known T to an unknown t*, it is natural to include t* explicitly in the Ž . Ž . algorithm in order to solve for c t and S t in an efficient and cost-effective way. Using the previous algorithm as an example, one can modify the Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . steps as follows: i Pick a positive t* t* F T and a positive c 0 . ii Ž . Ž . Ž . Given S and c 0 , solve numerically the differential equations 17 and 4
Ž . for c t and S t , t g 0, t* . iii Check whether 2 , 3 , and S t* s 0 are Ž . Ž . Ž . 11 satisfied. If yes, c t and S t are optimal. If no, return to step i . In this algorithm, the terminal wealth depletion time t*, which replaces the T in the previous algorithm, is treated explicitly as a parameter to be deter-Ž . Ž . mined. The objective of the algorithm is to solve for c t , S t , and t* 9 ࠻ Ž . Ž . Ž . w x Ž Notice that t s 0 because of 11 and the fact that c t ) 0 for t g 0, T see the . proof of Proposition 1 .
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Ž . It follows that the shooting algorithm Judd, 1998, pp. 353᎐354 cannot be applied to this type of model without further modifications. 11 For the above example, the optimal solution, which can be derived analytically, is given
by c t s m T y t r S q mT y S q 2 mTS , S t s S q mt q m T y t y
T r 2 S q mT y S q 2 mTS , and t* s S q 2 mTS y S rm, t g 0, t* . simultaneously. While other algorithms are possible, this one is probably the simplest one. If it is ever possible to design a numerical analysis without explicitly incorporating terminal wealth depletion, the required algorithm will be computationally demanding. The benefits of such a complicated algorithm will certainly outweigh the costs especially when it is compared with the simple algorithm given here. Thus, on both theoretical and practical grounds, it is necessary and advantageous to incorporate terminal wealth depletion into the design of the numerical analysis.
IV. EVIDENCE
To investigate practically how early the wealth is depleted, I conduct a Ž . simulation study using the conventional CRRA utility function, i.e., g c s Ž . Therefore, it makes no difference whether ⍀ t or ⍀ t is used in the Ž . simulation study. In other words, one can always justify ⍀ t by using Ž . ⍀ t , so the choice of the familiar Gompertz Law should not be a concern in this regard.
14

Ž .
Under this setup, t* can be solved numerically from 24 . The solution Ž .
0.087t
t* is unique because ⌬ t s y0.00008091e y ␣ q 0.03 for all t g w x Ž . Ž . 65, T , hence ⌬Ј t -0 and the condition in Leung 1997, Proposition 4 is satisfied. Diamond and Hausman 1984 and Hurd 1989 . The median wealth to income ratio is likely to be smaller than 5 because the distribution of wealth is more skewed than that of income. Hurd 1989 that low initial wealth is the cause of all the early terminal wealth depletion in his sample may be overly simplistic. Other factors such as poor health, low risk aversion, low interest rate, or high income could also be responsible. In sum, the simulation results support that the model can account for low wealth holdings and early terminal wealth depletion.
The above simulation exercise concentrates on the saving behavior between age 65 and T. An alternative is to start the simulation at a younger age, say 18, and trace the age-wealth profile between age 18 and T to examine whether the model predicts many people retiring with little or no assets. While this is apparently a more complete investigation, it is not really necessary to adopt such an approach to illustrate the point underscored in this paper. First, simulating the age-wealth profile between age 18 and T requires specific assumptions on the age-earnings profile be-Ž . tween age 18 and 65. As exemplified in Hubbard et al. 1995 , one can specify at least three different age-earnings profiles to capture differences in permanent income through educational attainment. Once the parame-Ž . Ž . ter values for ␥ , ␣ , are chosen, the value of S 65 rM will solely be Ž . determined by the age-earnings profile and S 18 . Thus, one can simulate the age-wealth profile for either different age-earnings profiles or different Ž . values of S 65 rM; the two are closely related because the choice of the Ž . age-earnings profile determines S 65 rM. I have attempted both and I do not report the results for different age-earnings profiles here because the borrowing constraint tends to bind several times or over a lengthy period w x Ž of time within the interval 18, 65 especially for people with a low . age-earnings profile , making the simulations unnecessarily complicated while adding very little in terms of understanding the essence of the problem. Second, it is not surprising to find that people with a low age-earnings profile reach retirement with little assets. One of the main objectives of this paper, however, is to claim and verify the more subtle point that even people with higher age-earnings profiles, and hence higher wealth to income ratios at retirement, may also exhaust their wealth rather rapidly after retirement. For this purpose it is sufficient to simulate the Ž . age-wealth profile between age 65 and T using higher values of S 65 rM such as 5 and 10.
Besides the simulation results, there is other supportive empirical evidence in the literature. In a nonparametric study using ten years of panel Ž . data from the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey, Hurd 1987 finds that the elderly in the sample generally decumulated real wealth. Excluding home equity, the estimated average rate of real wealth change is about y3.2% per annum, which suggests that a household will decumulate about 16 Ž . half of its wealth in 20 years. In a subsequent study, Hurd 1989 uses the same data set but estimates parametrically a structural model of life-cycle saving for the retired singles. The estimates imply that many retired singles will decumulate their entire wealth in less than 20 years. For instance, one Ž . set of estimates shows that the mean and the median times after age 65 Ž to terminal depletion of wealth are 15.9 and 16.4 years, respectively Hurd, . 1989, p. 802 . Additional evidence of dissaving is reported in recent studies Ž . Ž . by Attanasio and Hoynes 1995 and Hurd 1999 . 16 If housing wealth is included, then the estimated average rate of real wealth change is about y1.5% per annum, which means that about one quarter of wealth will be decumulated in 20 years. The role of housing wealth in testing life-cycle models of saving is discussed in Ž . Ž . detail in Hurd 1987 Ž . detail in Hurd , 1989 . In a sensitivity analysis, Kuehlwein 1995 confirms the dissaving Ž . finding of Hurd 1987 in many specifications, but raises questions about dissaving among couples and the method of elderly dissaving. More research is needed to assess the robustness of their procedures and findings.
These findings support my theory in two ways. First, the emergence of Ž . terminal wealth depletion in Hurd 1989 is exactly predicted by my theory. Second, the elderly, especially the singles, do decumulate their assets in a Ž . significant way. The dissaving finding of Attanasio and Hoynes 1995 and Ž . Hurd 1987 , 1999 stands in sharp contrast to the prevailing literature, which is largely based on cross-section data, that shows little evidence of Ž dissaving. Although some of the estimated dissaving rates e.g., 3.2% per . annum may not appear to be high enough to effect terminal wealth depletion within a short period of time, this should not be construed as evidence against my theory because the dissaving rates reported in the literature are typically mean or median values. What is more relevant to the present study is neither the mean nor the median rate of wealth decumulation, but the rates of wealth decumulation among the bottom two deciles of the distribution. As the focus of this paper is on the low-wealth elderly, empirical estimates of the average dissaving rate are not the most pertinent gauges for the validity of my theory. If the average elderly household decumulates its wealth at a rate of 3.2% per annum, then the bottom two deciles of elderly households must dissave more rapidly than 3.2% per annum. These bottom two deciles of elderly households will most likely account for a significant portion of the low-wealth elderly observed in the data. Unfortunately, none of these studies reports the distribution of the rate of wealth decumulation, so one cannot ascertain the dissaving rates among the bottom deciles. Nevertheless, given the high variability of the wealth distribution, there are good reasons to believe that the dissaving rates among the bottom two deciles of elderly households will be high enough to generate among them low wealth holdings and eventual wealth depletion within a reasonable period of time.
Another set of findings that lends credence to my theory is Sheiner and Ž . Ž . Weil 1992 and Jones 1996 . In the above theoretical analysis, home equity is treated no different from the other financial assets. Despite popular beliefs that elderly households do not decumulate their housing wealth, Sheiner and Weil find that households do significantly reduce their home equities as they age: about 58% of households will not leave behind a house when the last member dies. In addition, most households do not keep the money received from selling the houses. Sheiner and Weil strongly argue that previous studies have underestimated the decumulation rate of housing wealth. Similar findings of substantial home equity reduction by the elderly using both U.S. and Canadian data are reported in the Ž . preliminary study of Jones 1996 . A separate and growing body of empirical work on the relationship between mortality and wealth also provides evidence in favor of my theory.
Ž . Jianakoplos et al. 1989 find that the mortality rates of the elderly in the bottom two deciles of the wealth distribution are three times higher than those of the elderly in the top decile. Using a different data set, Attanasio Ž . and Hoynes 1995 obtain a similar result that the mortality rate of the elderly in the lowest wealth quartile is three times higher than that in the Ž . top wealth quartile. Menchik 1993 finds a strong inverse relationship between mortality and wealth even after controlling for other variables such as permanent income. These findings on the negative relationship Ž . 17 between mortality and wealth are all consistent with Proposition 2 ii .
Ž . V. A COMPARISON WITH DAVIES 1981
The results in the previous sections appear to be at odds with Davies Ž . 1981 . In a widely cited study, Davies proposes that uncertain lifetime can account for much of the observed slow dissaving among the elderly. By calibrating a life-cycle model of saving with income and survival data, he compares numerically consumption under certain lifetime with consumption under uncertain lifetime using different sets of parameter values. In a majority of the cases investigated, including those that are based on what Davies regards as ''best guess'' parameter values, he finds that consumption under certain lifetime is notably higher than consumption under uncertain lifetime. According to Davies, the results suggest that uncertain lifetime reduces dissaving. Such a finding is just opposite to the theme of this paper that uncertain lifetime increases dissaving. Because of the importance and influence of Davies' results, this issue warrants further investigation.
A critical problem in Davies' investigation is that it does not incorporate terminal wealth depletion into the design of the numerical analysis, despite the fact that his pension model is a special case of the model analyzed in Section II. As shown in Sections II and III, there must be terminal wealth depletion before the maximum lifetime and the depletion time should be explicitly incorporated into the design of the numerical analysis. To study the impact of incorporating terminal wealth depletion, I conduct a numerical analysis similar to Davies' and investigate whether uncertain lifetime tends to reduce consumption. As in the previous section, I study the model w x Ž . w x over the period 65, T and assume that m t s M for t g 65, T , where M is a positive constant.
Ž . Let c t denote the optimal consumption in a standard life-cycle model of saving under certain lifetime; then one can follow the derivation of Eq.
17
Ž
. Notice that the model here only considers the effect of mortality health on wealth. Of Ž course, the reverse causation is also possible e.g., lower wealth contributing to higher . mortality .
Ž .
Ž . ࠻ Ž . for t s 65, 66, . . . , t*. Replacing S t rM in 26 with S t rM, I obtain Ž . Ž . Ž . the value of c t rM for each t. Dividing 27 by 26 gives the desired ratiô ࠻ Ž . Ž . c t rc t for t s 65, 66, . . . , t*. This simulation design and procedure arê Ž . similar to those of Davies 1981, Sect. IV except that it explicitly takes into account the terminal wealth depletion time t* and expoits the con-࠻ Ž . stant income stream M in the formulation of the ratios c t rM and Ž . c t rM. It is easy to see that the procedure only requires an initial valuê Ž . Ž . for the ratio S 65 rM; neither S 65 nor M needs to be specified. Table II gives some of the simulation results. For brevity, only the case Ž . Ž . Ž . S 65 rM s 5 with all four values of ␣ as well as the case S 65 rM s 10 and ␣ s 0.03 is presented. 19 Contrary to the majority of Davies' results, 18 Ž . Ž . As will be shown below, the advantage in considering the ratio c t rM instead of c t inŽ . Ž . 26 is that it is not necessary to assume any specific values for S t and M in the Ž . computations; only the ratio S t rM needs to be specified. 19 Results for the other cases are available on request. Notice that Table II Davies 1981 shows that, out of the 168 ratios of c t rc t calculated, 42 arê greater than 1, which means that consumption under uncertain lifetime is higher than consumption under certain lifetime in only 25% of the cases investigated.
wealth can be run down at a faster rate. This demonstrates the importance of incorporating an explicit wealth depletion time into the simulations. 21 It is difficult to claim that the discrepancies between Davies' results and the findings presented in Table II elderly. Instead it shows the contrary that uncertain lifetime raises the rate of dissaving beyond what it would be if lifetime was certain. This result is consistent with the finding in the previous sections that uncertain lifetime reduces the desire to provide for the future. To explain the slow decumulation among the retired, one may have to turn to other factors that mitigate Ž . 23 impatience, e.g., self-control, habit, bequest motive Fisher, 1930 . An immediate question arises from the above analysis. Is the theory of terminal wealth depletion plainly rejected by the observed slow dissaving among the elderly? As shown in Table I , some of the terminal wealth depletion times are so small that they imply a very high asset decumulation Ž . rate. For example, t* s 70 in the case where ␥ s 1, ␣ s 0.1, S 65 rM s 1, and s 1, which implies that the annual dissaving rate after retirement is about 20%. How can such a high dissaving rate be reconciled with the observed low dissaving rate that Davies and others attempt to explain? Two answers can be offered. First, the observed dissaving rate refers to the mean of the distribution of dissaving rates. The present model, however, is designed to explain the lower tail of the distribution of dissaving rates because it addresses why a special group of elderly people has little or no Ž . wealth. Hence, a high dissaving rate say 20% per annum for one particular group of elderly people can be consistent with a low average Ž . dissaving rate say 4% per annum for the entire group of elderly people. Second, the observed slow decumulation among the elderly may not be a genuine phenomenon. There is increasing evidence that previous studies have underestimated the asset decumulation rates because they utilize Ž . cross-section instead of longitudinal data and they fail to control for Ž differential mortality effects see, e.g., Modigliani, 1986; Hurd, 1987; . Jianakoplos et al., 1989; Attanasio and Hoynes, 1995 . Thus, the observation is still tentative. 23 To be complete, it should be pointed out that Davies does find something like terminal Ž . Ž wealth depletion in a few cases 3 out of the 24 cases studied in his Table 3 e.g., the case . ␥ s 0.5, r s 0.03, and s r , although it is not clear whether his numerical analysis is Ž . conducted in an appropriate way as discussed in Section III above and whether the binding of the wealth constraint is temporary or terminal. In those cases, the results are similar to mine: consumption under uncertain lifetime is higher than that under certain lifetime. In Ž . fact, in his theoretical analysis, Davies 1981, pp. 571᎐572 speculates that consumption under uncertain lifetime will tend to be higher than consumption under certain lifetime if wealth is exhausted before the maximum lifetime. As he is not aware that wealth must be exhausted before the maximum lifetime and there are only a few cases of terminal wealth depletion in his simulation, he draws his conclusions based on the other cases.
VI. BEQUEST MOTIVE AND LIFE ANNUITY
The analysis so far has only explained why it is optimal for some elderly people to hold little or no wealth. To give a complete account for the stylized fact, one has to explain why only a significant fraction, but not all, of the elderly have little or no wealth. An immediate answer, which follows from Proposition 2, is that most elderly people may have high risk aversion, low discount rates, good health, high initial wealth, high interest rates, or low income. To add to this list of factors, this section shows that there are two more reasons for not depleting one's wealth early.
Suppose the individual has a bequest motive; then the decision problem in Section II becomes Ž .
࠻ Ž . Ž . Ž . whenever c t ) 0. The survival probability ⍀ t does not appear in 38 , so the arguments leading to Proposition 1 do not apply here. Thus, there is no terminal wealth depletion in this model. The presence of life annuities essentially removes the effect of uncertain lifetime from the saving decision. Based on these analyses, one can therefore add bequest motive and life annuity to the list of factors that may explain why a majority of the elderly do not deplete their wealth early.
Although the annuity markets are quite well developed, few people Ž . purchase life annuities Friedman and Warshawsky, 1988 . However, the elderly may insure against uncertain lifetime by means of risk pooling Ž . within the family Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981 . If family risk pooling operates as efficient as a perfect life annuity market, then these households do not need to deplete their wealth. Even if family risk pooling is less than perfect, it may be strong enough to put off the terminal wealth depletion time.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper develops a rational theory of terminal wealth depletion to explain the puzzle of widespread low wealth holdings especially among the elderly. Previous studies of saving have only vaguely discussed, but never proved analytically and unambiguously, how low wealth accumulation or terminal wealth depletion can take place. By incorporating uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint into the standard life-cycle model of saving, I demonstrate rigorously why and how terminal wealth depletion takes place and employ the comparative statics results to infer the probable characteristics of those individuals who save little and exhaust their wealth early. In addition to solving the puzzle, the analysis offers an analytical account for the unique finding of terminal wealth depletion in several recent studies, reveals the subtle relationship between theory and numerical analysis, and rejects the common perception that uncertain lifetime reduces dissaving.
A simple alternative explanation for the puzzle of widespread low wealth holdings among the elderly is that these households enter into retirement with little assets. Besides the low-lifetime-income argument, this explanation begs the question of why these households choose to have little assets when they begin to retire. My theory can help fill this void because for some households the asset decumulation process, which leads to terminal wealth depletion, may have started before they reach retirement. Although the simulations presented in the paper begin at age 65, it does not imply that in reality households decumulate only after they reach 65. The choice of age 65 is made simply for illustrative purposes; it is entirely possible, and in fact likely, that some households start dissaving earlier.
Although the analysis emphasizes the role of uncertain lifetime in depressing saving and depleting wealth, mortality risk is not necessarily the most important factor that determines when early terminal wealth depletion will take place. As illustrated in the comparative statics analysis, a young and healthy individual may deplete his wealth early depending on the interplay with other factors such as risk aversion, discount rate, interest rate, income, and initial wealth. From an analytical point of view, the main role of uncertain lifetime is to provide a mechanism by which terminal wealth depletion can be proved and characterized. For instance, many scholars have argued that the provision of social security pension is a major cause of low private savings. This paper delivers a rigorous theory to demonstrate why and how social security can displace private savings.
Ž . As reviewed in Jappelli 1990 , there is a good deal of evidence that a Ž . significant fraction of households especially the younger ones are liquidity constrained because they cannot borrow against their future earnings. The model can therefore provide a complete story for low wealth holdings among a significant fraction of the aged as well as the nonaged. When people are young, the borrowing constraint is binding because earnings are low. As they get older, increases in earnings ease the borrowing constraint. In the meantime, uncertain lifetime begins to exert its effect on saving and eventually leads to terminal wealth depletion.
Ž . The present analysis complements those of Hubbard et al. 1995 and Ž . Feldstein 1995 . Uncertain lifetime, low lifetime income, borrowing constraint, social insurance programs, and college scholarship rules together solve various pieces of the puzzle of widespread low wealth holdings. None of these factors alone can satisfactorily resolve the puzzle because there are many different motives for saving and there are various government policies and programs that influence the saving decision. The theory developed in this paper offers a general framework to enrich the analysis of saving behavior. For example, the model can be applied to study the impact of social insurance programs on the terminal wealth depletion time.
The theory proposed in this paper is testable because it predicts what types of people are more likely to save little and deplete their wealth early. In addition to an empirical test of the theory, an extensive simulation Ž . analysis along the lines of Hubbard et al. 1995 would be useful to determine how well the theory matches the data.
